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In a provocative and important recent article Anthony Marsella (1998) makes an 
eloquent plea for the forging of a new metadiscipline of psychology that he labels 
global-community psychology. Marsella argues that we need a radical rethinking of 
the fundamental premises of psychology, rooted as they are in Western cultural 
traditions. Features of an emergent global-community psychology include an 
emphasis on multicultural and multidisciplinary approaches to human behavior 
that draw attention to the importance of context and meaning in human lives. 
Marsella's call for a global-community psychology reflects, in part, a growing 
body of literature that demonstrates the importance of cultural factors in a diver-
sity of psychological domains such as cognition, emotion, social behavior, and 
psychopathology. 
The relationship between culture and cognition, for example, has been 
explored in some detail by both psychologists (e.g., Semin & Zweir, 1997; 
Serpell & Boykin, 1994), and anthropologists (e.g., Bloch, 1998; D'Andrade, 
1995). Bartlett's (1932) seminal work on the nature of human memory demon-
strated the ways in which cultural knowledge, embodied in schemas, can affect 
the pattern and process of memory reconstruction. More contemporary research 
attests to the way cultural factors can impinge on various aspects of cognition, 
including memory and reasoning (D'Andrade, 1995), attribution style (Morris & 
Peng, 1994; Semin & Zweir, 1997; Triandis, 1989), knowledge structures, 
(Serpell & Boykin, 1994), and value hierarchies (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). 
The importance of attending to cultural variables in understanding the nature of 
mental disorders is also becoming increasingly apparent (Tanaka-Matsumi & 
Draguns, 1997; Thakker & Ward, 1998). For example, the underlying philosophy 
of the universalist approach to the classification of psychopathology offered by 
the DSM-IV has been called into question. More specifically, the view 
entrenched in the biomedical model, that mental disorders are the same across 
cultures, cannot be sustained (Thakker & Ward, 1998). Presentation of major dis-
orders such as depression and schizophrenia have been shown to vary signif i-
cantly across cultures (see for example, Draguns, 1995; Kleinman, 1988; 
Westermeyer, 1989). Furthermore, the existence of a range of culture bound dis-
orders (although diagnostically somewhat controversial), suggests that a satis-
factory understanding of mental disorder must take into account the significance 
of cultural particulars (Kirmayer, 1991). Because cognitive factors often are 
viewed as central to the understanding of the diagnosis, etiology, and treatment 
of many mental disorders (e.g., Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997), there is much scope for an exploration of the var-
ious relations that occur between culture, cognition, and psychopathology, as 
contributors to this volume demonstrate. 
In this chapter, we aim to draw on and extend the implications of the body of 
research, briefly outlined above, in the context of a dynamic model of mental dis-
order; one that attempts to do justice to the rich interplay between cognitive, cul-
tural, and biological variables. First, we outline a theoretical perspective of the 
relations between culture, cognition, and biology presented in the context of a 
domain specific view of human cognitive architecture. Second, we illustrate the 
relationship between culture, cognition, and biology in the domain of psy-
chopathology, drawing on the example of anxiety disorder. Third, we present a 
model of mental disorder developed by Thakker, Ward, & Strongman (in press) 
that addresses the relationships between culture, cognition, and biology in the 
context of psychopathology. We conclude with some thoughts on the role of 
interdisciplinary integration in the domain of psychopathology. 
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
CULTURE, COGNITION, AND BIOLOGY 
"What we are is very much a matter of what culture has made us" suggests the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995, p. 340) in his recent book Darwin's Dangerous 
Idea. It is clear, as Dennett indicates, that people are influenced in a myriad of 
ways by the culture in which they are embedded. Belief systems or worldviews 
vary considerably across cultures, with potentially profound implications for 
human thought and behavior. The striking pattern of within-culture similarities 
and between-culture differences in human behavior is testimony to the role of 
culturally acquired patterns of beliefs, desires, and values. However, it is also 
clear that there are substantial degrees of similarity between peoples of different 
cultures, regardless of the specific patterns of beliefs and values that occur. 
Indeed, it has been argued that anthropologists and crosscultural psychologists 
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have focused predominantly on patterns of differences between cultures while 
neglecting relevant underlying similarities (Brown, 1991). 
The question of the nature and degree of crosscultural differences and, more 
generally, the extent or role that culture plays in human development, have been 
perennial themes in psychology, anthropology, and sociology. The well-worn 
distinctions between universalism and relativism and between culture and nature 
reflect this enduring interest. Focusing more specifically on the relations between 
culture and cognition we can make a distinction between weak and strong for-
mulations of cultural cognition. The weak version of the relationship between 
culture and cognition concedes that the contents of cognition are often highly 
variable across different cultures, however, the processes that underlie these vari-
ations are themselves crossculturally invariant. 
Thus, for example, although language varies in its surface features in different 
cultures, this variety is underpinned by universal psychological mechanisms that 
generate universal grammars (Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1994). Empirical support 
for this weak version of cultural cognition is provided by various  lines of 
research. For example, living-kind classification, the natural taxonomies of flora 
and fauna, shows strong commonalties across all cultures although the specific 
contents of the classification scheme are naturally variable (Berlin, 1978; Atran, 
1990). Specifically, there is a crosscultural tendency to classify living-kind entities 
in a hierarchical fashion and to treat biological species in essentialist terms. Of 
course, the specific animals and plants that people in different cultures treat in 
such fashions will be determined by local biogeographical features. 
In contrast to the weak version of cultural cognition, advocates of the strong 
version maintain that not only does the content of cognition vary across cultures, 
but so too does the very nature of cognitive processes. Culture here can be seen to 
radically affect the basic nature of cognitive and neural architecture. As the psy-
chologist Merlin Donald (1991, p. 14) suggests, "Cultures restructure the human 
mind, not only in terms of its specific contents, which are obviously culture 
bound, but also in terms of its fundamental neurological organization." An exam-
ple of such culture-based effects on neural organization is provided by 
Jovanovski (1995). According to Jovanovski, people raised in urban areas 
respond differently to visual tests than people who have grown up in rural areas. 
The former respond more readily to angular and structured stimuli whereas the 
latter show more sensitivity to less regular and perhaps more natural configura-
tions. This finding is explained as the result of differential deterioration of specific 
clusters of cells in the neural cortex during development. Jovanovski (1995) 
concludes on the basis of this research that " if cultural standards, impressions, 
and experiences can influence no less than our visual tendencies, then, indeed, 
we could hardly convincingly deny that those same social characteristics can and 
do give rise to context-identifiable ideas, interpretations, worries, phobias and 
obsessions" (p. 295). 
How are we to reconcile these two versions of cultural cognition? Should we 
accept the idea that cultures have the power to radically restructure the funda-
mental organization of the human mind, or is the influence of culture on 
cognition a more moderate one? This issue is crucial in the present context, for it 
lies at the heart of understanding how we should adequately conceptualize the 
importance of cultural factors in understanding the nature of mental disorder. We 
will argue that a richer understanding of the relationship between culture and 
cognition can be fruitfully obtained by adopting a domain specific or modular 
view of human cognition. Moreover, we argue that a consideration of biological 
factors, specifically evolutionary considerations, can further our understanding 
of the culture-cognition interface. Finally, we suggest that we must adopt an 
approach to human cognition that fully realizes the dynamic reciprocal relation-
ship between mind and world. These three themes reflect important general 
trends in cognitive theory. In what follows we address each of these points in 
turn, before combining the central ideas in a way that helps us further our under-
standing of both cognitive universality and cultural diversity. 
THE DECLINE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN PSYCHOLOGY 
In a comprehensive review of historical developments in cognitive theory, 
Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham (1998), note an increasing shift away from 
approaches to cognition that limit themselves to addressing information pro-
cessing within the mind, toward a recognition of the importance of the envi-
ronmental embeddedness of human cognitive systems. For a considerable 
period of time, mainstream cognitive psychologists have directed their intel -
lectual labors toward elucidating the internal systems of information process-
ing within the human mind via often highly artificial experimental protocols. 
This approach, by itself, however, has led to an impoverished view of the 
human mind; one that has failed to do full justice to the real -world nature of 
human cognition. 
This individualist research program in cognitive psychology, which has been 
labeled methodological solipsism by the philosopher Jerry Fodor (1980), has 
drawn a variety of criticisms from a diverse range of sources. Philosophers of 
various theoretical persuasions (e.g., Burge, 1986; Kitcher, 1985; Millikan, 
1993) have convincingly argued that the nature of mental states can only be fully 
understood by reference to the external environment. In a similar vein, 
researchers in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence have begun to 
direct their attention to the situated nature of human cognition (e.g., Clark, 1997) 
as it occurs in real-world environments (see Hutchins, 1995). 
Cognitive anthropologists (e.g., D'Andrade, 1995) have also drawn attention 
to the way in which environmental factors, specifically those related to the cul -
tural environment, can exert important influences on the nature of cognition. 
D'Andrade (1995) emphasizes that we should conceptualize the relationship 
between culture and cognition as essentially reciprocal in nature: the psyche is 
influenced by cultural representations, which themselves are selected and modi-
fied in terms of the capacities of the human cognitive system. 
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THE MODULARITY OF MIND 
Another important development in cognitive theory is the growing acceptance of 
some version of the modularity thesis of human cognitive architecture 
(Appelbaum, 1998). Made popular in part by Fodor (1983), proponents of the 
modularity thesis argue that human cognition can be best characterized as con-
taining many distinct subsystems that are dedicated to specific functions. 
Modular, or domain specific, approaches to the mind reject the view that knowl-
edge acquisition is driven by a few content -independent domain general 
processes. Instead, the human mind is replete with a multiplicity of content specific 
mechanisms dedicated to processing specific classes of information. 
The modularity thesis has received a growing body of empirical support. 
Specifically, there is evidence for modular mechanisms dedicated to various cog-
nitive domains such as language (Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1994), biological clas-
sification (Atran, 1990; Berlin, 1978), mental state attribution (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Leslie, 1987), object perception (Spelke, 1988), and numeracy (Wynn, 
1992), among others (see Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994, for a good review). 
However, there still remains considerable debate over many aspects of modularity. 
It is unclear just how many modules humans possess, how best to characterize 
them, what their relationships are to one another, and so forth (see 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, and Samuels, 1998, for interesting alternatives). We will not 
address these issues here. However, it is likely that the range of domain specific 
mechanisms that humans possess is likely to be supplemented by some more 
domain general processes, and that there are rich connections between different 
modules (conceptual ones at least) that give rise to the creative and flexible 
nature of human cognition. 
THE ROLE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
The importance of evolutionary theory for understanding the nature of human 
mentation and behavior has also received renewed interest in recent times (e.g., 
Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss, 1995; Pinker, 1997). Evolutionary 
psychologists argue that to understand how the mind works we must pay due 
attention to the problems that the mind has been designed to solve. The mind, it is 
suggested, is as much a product of evolution as is the body, and should be studied 
using similar methods. Although we reject the claim that evolutionary psychology 
provides a revolutionary new paradigm for psychological science (e.g., Buss, 1995), 
we would argue that questions of evolutionary origin are certainly relevant to our 
understanding of human cognition and its relation to culture. 
An evolutionary approach naturally meshes with both a domain specific view of 
mind and an anti-individualist approach to human cognition. Evolutionary 
psychologists (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Pinker, 1997) argue that cognitive 
modules are best characterized as evolved mechanisms with distinct 
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phylogenetic histories. A general purpose view of cognition, it is argued, is bio-
logically unfeasible, because what counts as adaptive behavior differs signifi -
cantly across different domains. Moreover, there must be some way in which 
learning is framed, or constrained, in order to direct the organism toward the nar-
row envelope of contextually relevant behavior. Furthermore, from an evolu-
tionary point of view, cognition must be embedded in the real world. That is, for 
adaptive behavior to be generated there must be rich, reciprocal relations 
between the mind and the environment, including the social environment, 
EXPLAINING CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
At first glance, a modular theory of mind, coupled with an evolutionary per-
spective, may seem unable to do justice to an understanding of the role of culture in 
cognition, and the generation of cultural diversity. However, if we accept the 
thoroughly epigenetic character of human cognitive development, cultural diversity 
can be viewed as a natural consequence of an evolved, domain specific mind 
embedded in a rich social and cultural environment. Cultural learning, according to 
this perspective, is not a passive domain general affair (cultures do not entirely 
determine the nature of thought), but rather is best thought of as active, directed, 
and domain specific in character. The view we adopt here is nicely summarized by 
E. 0. Wilson (1998) in his recent book Consilience: 
Culture is created by the communal mind, and each mind in turn is the product of the 
genetically structured human brain. Genes and culture are therefore inseverably linked. 
But the linkage is flexible, to a degree still mostly unmeasured. The linkage is also tortuous: 
Genes prescribe epigenetic rules, which are the neural pathways and regularities in cognitive 
development by which the individual mind assembles itself. The mind grows from birth 
to death by absorbing parts of the existing culture available to it, with selec tions guided 
through the epigenetic rules inherited by the individual brain. (p. 127) 
To understand how cultural diversity is generated from this perspective, it is 
useful to consider the important distinctions made by the cognitive anthropologist 
Dan Sperber (1996) between proper and actual domains. The proper domain of 
some conceptual module is all the information in the organism's environment that it 
is the module's biological function to process; the actual domain is all the 
information that satisfies the module's input conditions. For example, the 
living-kind module alluded to earlier has been designed to process information 
about biological species that one encounters in the environment. However, the 
actual domain of this module will include information about all sorts of other 
entities such as dinosaurs and dragons, which we have had no direct experience 
with at all. In a similar fashion, our theory-of-mind module, designed to generate 
causal explanations of human behavior in terms of intentional states (beliefs, 
desires, and so forth), is employed to explain the behavior of other animals, and 
even nonbiological entities such as weather systems and automobiles. In these cases, 
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what remains invariant across individuals are the underlying cognitive opera -
tions, while content is free to change depending on specific local details. 
Cultural cognition, therefore, can be seen to be generated from an active 
process of domain specific learning across varying cultural contexts. Although 
innate knowledge structures guide the organisms to certain classes of informa-
tion in the environment, culture strongly influences the subsequent form that the 
acquired knowledge will take. As Gardner (1983, 1985) has argued, modules 
undergo lengthy developmental constructions and thus are open to potentially 
strong influences from social and cultural factors. 
The perspective on the human mind we have presented in this section thus far 
suggests that the weak version of the cultural cognition hypothesis is both true 
and potentially highly relevant in understanding human behavior. Although 
learning, including cultural learning, is likely to some extent to be constrained 
along domain specific lines, there are substantial degrees of freedom available 
for the generation of culturally unique patterns of representations. Moreover, the 
way various systems of information are integrated in the mind provides further 
avenues for cultural differentiation. We remain agnostic, however, on the strong 
version of cultural cognition. Although it is unlikely that cultures radically alter 
fundamental cognitive processes within domains, there is still room for substantial 
cognitive reorganization on the basis of specific patterns of development. In 
evaluating the plausibility of the strong hypothesis on cultural cognition, it is best to 
proceed on a case-by-case basis. 
In the next section we explore some of the implications of the framework pre-
sented above in the context of psychopathology. More specifically, we demon-
strate the interplay of cognitive, cultural, and biological variables in the context 
of anxiety disorders. 
CULTURE AND COGNITION IN THE CONTEXT OF 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: ANXIETY DISORDERS 
Anxiety disorders provide a potentially fruitful example for illustrating the 
interrelationships that occur between cognitive, cultural, and evolutionary factors 
in the context of mental disorder. Research on anxiety disorders has often 
directed attention to the role of cognitive processing mechanisms (e.g., Beck & 
Emery, 1985; Eysenck, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Williams et al., 1997) 
as well as invoking the potentially functional or adaptive role that anxiety has to 
play (e.g., Beck & Emery, 1985; Marks, 1987; Marks & Nesse, 1994). 
Crosscultural investigations have also revealed considerable cultural patterning 
in the manifestation of anxiety disorders, as well as the occurrence of specific 
culture bound instances of anxiety related disturbances (e.g., Al-Issa & Oudji, 
1998; Kirmayer, 1991; Levine & Gaw, 1995). 
Many important approaches to anxiety have adopted a cognitive perspective. 
For example, Beck and Emery (1985) have argued that cognitive factors are 
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central to the etiology and maintenance of a wide range of anxiety disorders. 
Beck and Emery emphasize the role that schemata—cognitive structures that 
influence a person's appraisals and interpretations of experiences—have to play 
in relevant information processing tasks. Schemata direct processing resources 
toward certain aspects of the situation that they are congruent with. The schemata 
of anxious individuals are characterized by themes of danger, vulnerability, and 
threat. Thus a range of cognitive distortions and biases are generated in anxious 
individuals that influence how they experience events and that feed back into 
their cognitive and emotional states. 
Other important theoretical approaches to anxiety (e.g., Eysenck, 1997; 
Williams et al., 1997) have also adopted a cognitive perspective. Although to 
some extent similar to the approach pursued by Beck and Emery (1985), both 
Eysenck and Williams et al. have extended the work of Beck and Emery by high-
lighting the importance of attending to multiple levels of processing in the con-
text of anxiety disorders. The distinction between perceptual and conceptual 
processing favored by Williams et al. (1997), for example, is helpful in under-
standing the nature of unconscious attentional mechanisms that appear to be rel-
evant in the generation of anxiety states. What all the cognitive approaches to 
anxiety disorders emphasize, however, is the importance of examining the nature 
of specific attentional and interpretive biases. 
The occurrence of such processing biases in anxious individuals has received 
considerable empirical support from a diverse range of experimental studies (for 
reviews see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mineka & Gilboa, 1998; Mineka & 
Sutton, 1992). The general finding from this body of literature is that anxiety is 
closely associated with typically automatic preconscious biases for threatening 
information. Some kind of attentional biases seem to exist in all anxiety disorders. 
Cognitive biases and distortions have been found in patients with social phobia 
(Foa, Franklin, Perry & Herbert, 1996; Wells & Clark, 1997), panic disorder 
(Khawaja & Oei, 1998), post-traumatic stress disorder (Cassidy, McNally & 
Zeitlin, 1992), and specific phobias (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock & Trezise, 1986). 
Such biases have been shown to occur entirely unconsciously (e.g., Ohman & 
Soares, 1994), although for some anxiety disorders, such as social phobia, con-
scious cognitive distortions are also implicated (Wells & Clark, 1997). 
The specific pattern of attentional and interpretative biases found in anxiety 
disorders, along with the nature of the stimuli that elicit them, has led a number of 
researchers to adopt an evolutionary framework (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 
1990; Beck & Emery, 1985; Marks, 1987; Marks & Nesse, 1994). Broadly 
speaking, advocates of evolutionary approaches suggest that anxiety in general is 
adaptive, because it directs cognitive resources and motivates behavior in a manner 
that is likely to reduce the possibility of harm and hence increase reproductive 
success. Anxiety disorders, from this perspective, simply reflect exaggerations of 
various subtypes of normal anxiety (Marks & Nesse, 1994). Marks and Nesse 
stress the relative domain specificity of anxiety responses; subtypes of anxiety 
evolved to give selective advantages to particular kinds of danger. These 
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subtypes, however, are only partly differentiated because different threats often 
co-occur, and similar responses to diverse stimuli are sometimes indicated. 
The early work of Marks (1969) and Seligman (1970) on the development of 
phobias had implicated the role of evolutionarily prepared biases in both atten-
tion and learning. Marks argued that humans are more likely to attend to phylo-
genetically relevant stimuli in the world, a phenomenon he labeled prepotency. In 
a similar fashion, Seligman argued that humans are more likely to learn fear 
associations to some classes of stimuli but not to others; that is, humans are pre-
pared to develop fears to objects and events in the world that have important con-
sequences for survival and reproduction. This approach to the development of fears 
and phobias helps to explain the nonrandom distribution of such fears. As Marks 
(1987) suggests, humans are more likely to develop phobias to objects and events 
that would have posed specific threats to reproductive success in ancestral 
environments. Thus fear of spiders, snakes, heights, social situations, 
enclosed spaces, and so forth are more prevalent than are fears of dangerous but 
novel stimuli such as cars and electric outlets. An evolutionary approach also 
helps to explain the ontogenetic development of such fears and phobias. For 
example, a fear of heights appears in infants immediately prior to the average age 
that they begin crawling and intensifies with crawling experience. Similarly, a 
fear of animals emerges at about age two—an age when infants begin to explore 
further afield (see Ost, 1987, for details of the ages when different phobias typically 
emerge). To summarize, evolutionary approaches to anxiety disorders emphasize the 
role of innate domain specific mechanisms that direct attention (often 
preconsciously—see Ohman, 1997) toward certain kinds of stimuli in the world: 
ones that have phylogenetic relevance. 
Evolutionary approaches to anxiety disorders, however, have not gone without 
criticism (e.g., Davey, 1995; McNally, 1987; Merckelbach & de Jong, 1997). 
Questions have been asked regarding the putative adaptive advantages of spe-
cific phobias, such as blood injury phobia (Page, 1994), and their have been cri-
tiques of more general approaches such as Seligman's preparedness theory 
(McNally, 1987; Davey, 1995). The details of these criticisms will not concern us 
here, however. What emerges as prominent in the challenges to evolutionary 
approaches is the role that cultural factors have to play in the nature of anxiety 
disorders. Both Davey (1995) and Merckelbach and de Jong (1997) argue that 
variations in social taboos, culturally variable patterns of beliefs, locally relevant 
information about potential dangers, and so forth, exert potentially powerful effects 
on the development of specific fears. Cultural schemata are conceptual ized as 
providing strong top-down influences on the cognitive mechanisms that direct 
attention toward relevant stimuli in the environment. Hence it is suggested that it 
may be cultural, rather than evolutionary, factors that generate expectancy biases 
regarding the sorts of objects and situations toward which people develop fears and 
phobias. 
Crosscultural approaches to anxiety disorders suggest that they are a universal 
phenomenon. However, the events that precipitate anxiety are strongly 
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influenced by a diverse range of cultural factors (Aderibigbe & Pandurangi, 
1995; Al-Issa & Oudji, 1998; Levine & Gaw, 1995). Al-Issa and Oudji (1998, p. 
144), for example, in a recent review of culture and anxiety, conclude: 
"Epidemiological data suggests [sic] that anxiety disorders are universal. 
However, the meaning of the concept of anxiety and of its manifestations seem[s] to 
vary from one culture to another." The existence of a number of culture bound 
anxiety syndromes serves to underscore this conclusion. Some examples of such 
culture bound disorders include ataque de nervios, dhat, kayak angst, brain fog, 
koro, and taijin kyofusho (Levine & Gaw, 1995). 
Koro, to take one example, provides an instructive illustration of the role that 
cultural beliefs have to play in the manifestation of anxiety. Koro occurs in a 
diverse range of cultures but is most prominent in India, Southeast Asia, and 
China (Aderibigbe & Pandurangi, 1995). Koro is characterized by an extreme 
fear that the penis is retracting into the abdomen and will eventually cause death. 
Individuals with this fear experience extreme panic and terror, often accompa-
nied with heart palpitations, outbursts of sweating, and catastrophic cognitions 
relating to sexual functioning and the sexual organs (Levine & Gaw, 1995). Koro 
appears to be associated with a specific pattern of beliefs regarding the existence of 
koro itself, as well as more general beliefs and values centered on micturation, 
masturbation, and sexual functioning. The role of beliefs in koro itself in the eti-
ology of this disorder is clearly illustrated in the incidence of koro epidemics, 
such as the one that occurred in Guangdong, China (Tseng, Mo, Jing, Li, Ou, 
Chen & Jiang, 1988). Koro has, however, been reported in individuals with no prior 
knowledge of the disorder. For example, Chowdhury & Rajbhandri (1995) report a 
case of koro in a Nepali patient, which in the absence of any preexisting beliefs 
about koro, seemed to be related to more specific beliefs about the fear of semen 
depletion and guilt associated with masturbation. A general model of koro proposed 
by Simons (1985) suggests that endemic beliefs about koro (and general beliefs 
about sexual functions, seminal fluid, and so forth) lead to a greater monitoring and 
awareness of penile states, which leads in turn to anxiety if the penis appears to be 
smaller than usual. This anxiety, by reducing blood flow to the penis, increases 
penile shrinkage, leading to a feedback loop of mounting anxiety. This feedback 
loop is exacerbated when a koro epidemic is believed to be occurring. 
The example of koro and other such culture bound disorders seems to be prob-
lematic from an evolutionary perspective. It is hard to see how catastrophic cog-
nitions and attentional biases directed at penile states is likely to further 
reproductive goals (although no doubt some such story could be concocted). 
Moreover, the culture specific nature of koro seems to implicate the role of more 
general and culturally idiosyncratic patterns of belief. However, we argue that 
the adaptive nature of anxiety has both more general and specific characteristics (see 
Marks & Nesse, 1994, for a similar perspective), and nicely illustrates the 
complementary role of evolutionary and cultural factors. Because what is harmful 
and threatening in the environment is, in some cases, specific to given times 
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and locations, some learning mechanisms implicated in the development of fears 
are relatively content free. That is, the learning mechanisms are directed toward 
what other individuals in the community find aversive or threatening; subse-
quently, some fears will be idiosyncratic to particular cultural or historical con-
texts. In addition, other kinds of threats are likely to have been more enduring in 
nature. Thus fears of social exclusion, certain kinds of animals, heights, 
strangers, and so forth are representative of recurrent threats to survival and 
reproductive success. More domain specific mechanisms are implicated in the 
generation of fears in such contexts. Of course, such specific fears can still be 
exacerbated, attenuated, or altered in various ways depending on specific cultural 
and developmental contexts. Thus the attentional and interpretive biases found in 
the context of anxiety disorders reflects both phylogenetically and ontogeneti -
cally mediated influences that are directed toward specific objects and events in 
the physical and cultural environment. 
The dynamic, interactive, role that biological and cultural factors have to play in 
the context of anxiety disorders is nicely illustrated in the case of social phobias. 
With a lifetime prevalence of eleven and fifteen percent for men and women, 
respectively, social phobias are one of the more common anxiety disorders that 
clinicians are presented with (Kessler, McGonagle, Shanyang, Nelson, Hughes, 
Eshleman, Wittchen, & Kendler, 1994). Cognitive approaches to social phobia 
(e.g., Wells & Clark, 1997) stress the important role that various cognitive distor-
tions, especially pertaining to the self, have to play in the etiology and mainte -
nance of this disorder. Various lines of research indicate that socially anxious 
individuals engage in excessive degrees of self-focused processing in social situ-
ations (e.g., Hartman, 1983; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990). Social 
phobics are also more likely to choose negative interpretations of ambiguous 
social situations (Stopa & Clark, 1993) and overestimate the probability that neg-
ative social events are likely to occur (Foa et al., 1996). These distortions tend to 
be domain specific in character, only occurring in the context of social situations. 
Fear of social exclusion, argues Baumeister and Tice (1990), is one of the 
major causes of anxiety and is the essential factor underlying the fears exhibited 
in social phobics. It is suggested that the desire for interpersonal belongingness 
is a fundamental human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), one that reflects an 
evolutionary history of adaptation to social life. Threats of social exclusion gen-
erate anxiety, as such indications may be symptomatic of rejection from one's 
group, which in ancestral environments would have entailed substantial costs in 
fitness. Baumeister and Tice (1990) indicate that such threats of social exclusion 
are perceived as threats to the self. The self has the important function of relat -
ing a person to their social group. Self-esteem, therefore, may function as a proxy 
measure of one's interpersonal status (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). 
Individuals with social phobia represent cases where a concern for social inclu-
sion, coupled with relatively low self-esteem, generates an excessive monitoring 
of one's behavior in social contexts, leading to negative evaluations of social per-
formance and the various symptom patterns characteristic of social phobia. 
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The important role of the self in the generation of social anxiety suggests that 
social phobias should manifest in different ways across cultures. This follows 
from a consideration of the way that the construction of the self varies depend-
ing on the specific cultural contexts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991;  Markus, 
Mullaly, & Kitayama, 1997; Triandis, 1989). Specifically, whereas in Western 
cultures the self is conceptualized as an independent entity, in other collectivist 
cultures, such as Japan, the self is an interdependent construct, one that draws its 
meaning from the context of specific, often highly homogenous social groups. 
These differences imply different pathways for the generation of self-esteem. As 
Baumeister and Tice (1990, p. 178) suggest: " ... high self-esteem arises from 
believing that one possesses the traits that should maximize one's chances for 
being included in social groups." 
In the context of Western culture the characteristics indicative of high 
self-esteem and social inclusion include the maintenance of independence, 
material success, and self-enhancement. By contrast, collectivist cultures 
emphasize that a positive view of self is intimately linked to the appropriate 
adjustment of oneself so as to fit in with others in interpersonal situations. These 
crosscultural differences in the construction of self and corresponding differences 
in the values associated with social inclusion, should generate variations in the 
contexts that generate social anxiety. Specifically, in individualistic Western 
cultures, fear of being negatively evaluated by others should be a primary 
social concern, whereas in collectivist cultures, fear of not "fitting in" or of 
giving offense should be relativity more important in social situations. 
The existence of the culture bound syndrome taijin kyofusho and the way it 
contrasts with social phobia as it is manifest in Western cultures is an instructive 
illustration of some of the differences outlined above. Taijin kyofusho is a com-
mon disorder in Japan and is characterized by an excessive concern with offending 
others by inappropriate social behavior. Typical concerns include fear of 
embarrassing others by blushing, generating offensive body odors, or having 
unpleasant facial expressions (Kirmayer, 1991). The unique pattern of symptoms 
found in taijin kyofusho are linked to the importance of certain values in 
Japanese culture such as those related to the importance of acting appropriately 
in front of other individuals. The complex demands of intricately structured status 
hierarchies in Japan further contribute to the etiology and maintenance of this 
disorder (Kirmayer, 1991). The development of an interdependent view of self in 
Japan brings to the fore concerns related to maintaining the appropriate pattern of 
social behavior in interpersonal contexts. 
In summary, universal concern with social inclusion and belongingness to 
one's social group leads, in some individuals, to social anxiety when such inclu-
sion is perceived to be threatened. The mechanisms that are implicated in the 
evaluation of one's social acceptance are intricately linked to the construction of 
self. Following Baumeister and Tice (1990), we suggest that the self can be 
viewed as an adaptation to social life that functions to provide information 
regarding one's relative position within the social group. Because the nature of 
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the self varies across cultures, the sorts of situations that generate threats to the 
self will also manifest cultural variability. These differences will generate varia -
tions in the etiology and symptomology of socially related anxiety disorders. 
Thus innately prepared, domain specific fears can generate cultural diversity in 
the manifestation of specific disorders, depending on specific developmental 
pathways. In accordance with this view, a disorder such as taijin kyofusho can be 
conceptualized as being bioculturally constructed. More generally, a view of 
cognition (itself central to an understanding of a diverse range of mental disor-
ders) that emphasizes the centrality of context, evolutionary forces, and domain 
specificity can help us understand both the ubiquity of anxiety disorders as well 
as the specific patterns of cultural differences that are found. The relative 
explanatory role that evolutionary or cultural factors may play in the context of 
anxiety disorders can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis. However, we 
wish to highlight here that our understanding of anxiety disorders, and indeed 
mental disorders in general, is advanced by considering the interplay of multiple 
factors, including those of a cognitive, cultural, and biological nature. A model 
of mental disorder, which aims to capture this interplay, is presented in the fol-
lowing section. 
Cognitive Theory in Context: A 
Model of Mental Disorder 
The examples presented above suggest that in the context of psychopathology 
there are particular aspects of cognition that vary across cultures. Cognitive vari-
ability is linked on the one hand to specific biological aspects of cognitive devel-
opment, and on the other to patterns of cultural diversity. In order to fully 
understand the relationship between culture and cognition in the context of psy-
chopathology, it is useful to develop a visual conceptualization of the interrela-
tionships between these variables. Figure 14.1 depicts a model that has been used 
elsewhere to define mental disorder (Thakker, Ward, & Strongman, in press). 
However, it is equally useful as a means for conceptualizing the nature of cogni-
tion and the connection between cognition and other variables that are relevant 
to psychopathology. Arguably, an adequate theory of cognition must look not 
only at "core" cognitive components, but also at the forces that act on those com-
ponents, such as sociocultural and biological factors. Also relevant are factors 
that are unique to the individual, who may be referred to as the "self." 
According to this view, then, cognition is part of a system that has four main 
components: (1) psychological components, which are the mental processes that 
are seen as central to cognition, and in relation to which cognition is typically 
defined; (2) biological components, which are the "hardware" underlying the 
mental processes; biological components can also be thought of in ultimate terms 
in respect to evolutionary adaptation and phylogenetic history; (3) sociocultural 
variables, which constitute the social environment in which the person exists; 
and (4) the self, which is the individual element or, more precisely, the unique 
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 Figure 14.1. A model of mental disorder. 
confluence of all the components. The placing of the self in the center of the 
model emphasizes the very significant and dynamic impact that the self has on all 
other factors. As indicated by the arrows in the representation, all the variables 
interact, sometimes directly and sometimes via the self. However, the self as an 
active purveyor and processor of meaning is seen as critical in the manifestation of 
mental disorder. 
While, as mentioned, this model was previously presented simply as a defini -
tion of mental disorder, it is wholly pertinent to the present discussion insofar as it 
provides a formulation of the relationship between culture and cognition in the 
context of psychopathology. In terms of understanding mental disorders—espe-
cially their etiologies and crosscultural determinants—it is advantageous to ana-
lyze cognition in relation to other significant variables with which cognition 
interacts. However, although this model has four components, each of which is 
proposed to be essential to understanding psychopathology, it is theorized 
(Thakker, Ward, & Strongman, in press) that the extent of involvement of each 
component may vary across disorders. What is suggested, then, is that some dis-
orders may have a strong biological component, whereas others may have a 
stronger cultural component. The key point is that different disorders are seen as 
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having different etiological pathways, not simply in terms of the precise cause but 
also in terms of the general type of cause. 
A useful distinction to employ in this context is the one drawn by the philoso-
pher Peter Railton (1981) between relevance and salience. Railton argues that we 
should be striving for ideally complete explanations in science, ones that can 
elaborate the full panoply of causal (and noncausal) connections that obtain 
between phenomena. Such an explanation, however, is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Individual scientists labor, instead, on illuminating specific aspects of the ideal 
causal story, and are strongly influenced by pragmatic concerns. The complete 
causal story determines what is relevant in a particular case, while salience is 
determined on a more individual basis. Thus in the context of mental disorder, 
aspects of biology, cognition, culture, and self are all relevant in furthering our 
understanding of all mental disorders. However, some kinds of variables will be 
more salient, depending on the disorder under consideration. 
For example, in the case of a disorder such as dementia, although it may have 
important cognitive and cultural aspects, biological variables are probably most 
salient, in terms of specific patterns of neural degeneration in the brain. Autism, on 
the other hand, is perhaps most saliently conceptualized as a cognitive disorder, 
one that results as the malfunction to the "theory-of-mind module" (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). In contrast, the Japanese culture bound syndrome of taijin kyofusho 
(Kirmayer, 1991) suggests the salience of variables that focus on the relationship 
between culture and the self. Patients with taijin kyofusho, as outlined earlier, 
demonstrate an extreme form of social phobia characterized by an excessive 
concern with offending others by inappropriate social behavior. It is likely that 
cultural variables relating to the inappropriateness of emotional display and the 
interdependence of self, characteristic of collectivist cultures such as Japan, are 
predominantly responsible for the specific nature of this disorder. Of course the 
more general fear of social exclusion is probably universal in nature and may 
reflect the presence of mechanisms that have evolved to respond to more enduring 
and ubiquitous threats to survival; so other sorts of variables are relevant in this 
context, but are arguably not as salient. 
One important aspect of the model presented here is that it views psy-
chopathology as occurring within a context. Behavior is mediated by beliefs and 
values (that is, psychological or cognitive variables) that are influenced to vari -
ous degrees by cultural circumstances, depending on the specific psychological 
domain in question. The breakdown of behavior also has similar constraints. 
These constraints work in two ways. First, behavior is influenced by implicit 
rules governing that which is considered normal; even when people are mentally 
unwell they still will attempt to conform to the expectations of those around 
them. Second, behavior is influenced by folk conceptions and folk categories of 
mental disorder; people who are mentally ill will be affected by their own ideas of 
mental illness and by what they believe is typical of people who are "mad" or who 
have "lost their minds." The impact of cultural beliefs and values on the nature of 
mental disorders can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis, and will 
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depend in part on the cognitive domains under consideration. It is clear, however, 
that any fully realized theory of mental disorder must pay due attention to the 
influence of cultural factors on cognition, biology, and the self. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have considered the importance of cognitive theory for 
understanding the way that cultural variables impact on the nature of psy-
chopathology. We suggest that a view of cognition informed by a domain spe-
cific evolutionary approach can prove fruitful in understanding the relationships 
that exist between culture and cognition and thus between culture and mental dis-
order. Because, regardless of domain specific constraints, cognitive development 
is thoroughly epigenetic in nature, there is substantial room for the generation of 
cultural diversity at the cognitive level, which has important implications for the 
nature of self and the etiology and presentation of psychiatric disorders. 
Marsella (1998), in his plea for a global-community psychology, embraces the 
values of theoretical pluralism, cultural diversity, and interdisciplinary intellec -
tual endeavor. We concur with these values and suggest that the plenitude of the-
ories of mental disorder pitched at multiple levels of analysis needs to develop in a 
way that fosters mutual coherence between theories. Thus our best cognitive 
theories of mental disorder should be consistent with and informed by our best 
biological and cultural theories, and vice versa. Furthermore, our efforts at the -
ory construction in the field of mental disorder should be informed by the efforts 
of mainstream psychologists working in a variety of domains. Shweder and 
Sullivan (1993, p. 517) in their review of cultural psychology conclude by sug-
gesting that "The 1990's is the decade of ethnicity. It should also be the decade 
when anthropologists and psychologists (and linguists and philosophers) unite to 
deepen our understanding of the varieties of normal consciousness." We endorse 
these general ideas, but would add (now that the decade has drawn to an end), 
that a richer understanding of abnormal psychological processes is similarly 
advanced by considered crossdisciplinary investigations. 
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